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The Complexities of Comparative Advantages 
Wolfgang Zank 
Aalborg University 
Currently, "globalisation" and its effects are again being debated with emotions running 
high. This makes sense because there are not many factors which have transformed the 
globe more profoundly than the progress of international economic dependency in its 
various forms (trade, free movement of capital, the growing importance of transnational 
finns, etc.). This paper concentrates upon trade. 
Since the days of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, most economists have argued that 
international trade is basically beneficial for all parts involved. However, various 
"heterodox" thinkers such as Friedrich List, Raul Prebish, Gunnar Myrdal , or more 
recently Paul Krugman, have argued that free trade can produce negative consequences, 
in particular for the weaker partners. Even Paul A. Samuelsen, who for decades has used 
his formidable formal skills to demonstrate the benign effects of free trade, has turned 
very pessimistic as to this point) . In this paper, we do not follow the ramifications of that 
debate, basically we stick to the model of Comparative Advantages, developed around 
1815. At closer look, this model is not just a fanfare for unconditional free traders (as it is 
often presented). Although it does indeed support the opinion that free trade is beneficial 
for both partners in many cases, the implications of this model also show that free trade 
can produce negative results in many other cases. We try to specify the conditions under 
which this can happen. 
Adam Smith and the Advantages of an International Division of Labour 
The perhaps strongest argument in favour of free international trade is based upon the 
assumption that an international division of labour increases the wealth of all partners 
involved, and that free trade leads to exactly this division of labour. This line of 
argumentation was fonnulated in a consistent form presumably the first time by Henry 
Martyn in his Considerations upon the East India Trade (1701), a pamphlet in which he 
attacked the monopoly of the East India Company. 2 The argument gained enormous 
influence when taken up by Adam Smith some 70 years later. Smith identified the 
refinement of the division of labour as the most important source of wealth at all. 
Consequently, an extension of the division of labour which exists inside a country, to an 
international division of labour, generates even more wealth. The very opening sentence 
of Smith's Wealth of Nations (1776) reads: "The greatest improvement in the productive 
powers of labour ... seem to have been the effects ofthe division of labour.") Division of 
labour means specialisation. But specialisation requires that a person who specialises on, 
let ' s say, shoe production, can exchange shoes for e.g. bread. From this Smith concluded 
that the extent of the market plays a decisive role. In his own words: "As it is the power 
of exchanging, that gives occasion to the division of labour, so the extent of this division 
must always be limited by the extent of .. . the market. When the market is very small, no 
person can have any encouragement to dedicate himself entirely to one employment, for 
want of power to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is 
over and above his consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men's labour as 
he has occasion for. 
There are some sorts of industry ... which can be carried on nowhere but in a great town 
". As by means of water-carriage a more extensive market is opened to every sort of 
industry than what land-carriage alone can afford it, so it is upon the sea-coast, and along 
the banks of navigable rivers, that industry of every kind naturally begins to subdivide 
and improve itself...,,4 
It followed from this approach that every policy which extended the border of markets, 
and which consequently allowed for more division of labour, also generated more wealth. 
1 See Randall Hinshaw (ed,), The World Economy in Transition. What Leading Economists Think, 
Cheltenham, UKIBrookfield, US, 1996, p. 8-24. 
2 Douglas A. Irwin, Against the Tide, An Intellectual History oj Free Trade, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1996, p. 56-59, 
J Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Books I-III, With an Introduction by Andrew Skinner, 
Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1986, p. 109. 
4 Ibid" p, 121f. 
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This was also valid for any international division of labour. Again in Smith's own words: 
"If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can 
make it, better buy it of them with the produce of our own industry, employed in a way 
which we have some advantage."s So, Great Britain should concentrate on the production 
of commodities at which she was good at (at which she had "an advantage"). In modem 
texts his theory often referred to as a theory of "absolute advantages". 
A simple numerical model can illustrate Smith's argument. Let us suppose there are two 
countries, we name them "Great Britain" and "France". For the sake of simplicity, we 
suppose that both countries produce only two commodities, coal and hats, and both 
countries have a work force of two labourers. These assumptions grossly simplifY reality, 
of course. The argument holds, however, also if we enlarge the model to many countries, 
to many more commodities, and to many more people involved. But such an enlargement 
would only make the formal argumentation much more complex, without adding 
substance to it, so, at this point, we can stick to the simple version. 
One further assumption is crucial: We assume the respective productivities to be 
different: In "France", one worker can produce 5 hats pr day, but he can only mine 1 sack 
of coal. The French are simply better at making hats than coal mining. With the British, 
the matter is reversed: One worker can produce 5 sack of coals per day, but only I hal. 
The figures are, of course, arbitrary, they shall illustrate a line of reasoning, they do not 
depict a historical situation. 
, As quoted in Douglas A. Irwin, Against the Tide. An Intellectual History of Free Trade, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1996, p.79. 
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If we additionally assume that each country employs one worker at the production of each 
commodity, the following matrix of production appears: 
Great Britain 
France 5 
Table I: The pattern of production in "Great Britain " and "France ", before trade and international 
specialisation, assuming two workers per country, and productivity (measured in production units per day) 
as indicated 
If there is no foreign trade, the two countries can only consume what they produce 
themselves: The British can heat with 5 sacks of coal, but they have only 1 hat; the 
French can allow themselves to follow fashion, they have got 5 hats, But they have to be 
content with only I sack of coal. Given the country's fortunate climatic conditions, this is 
perhaps not so grave. 
This pattern of production and consumption is, however, according to Smith and other 
liberal economists, not advisable. They would recommend that Great Britain should 
concentrate upon coal, and France on hats, Thereafter they can exchange their products, 
and both countries will be much off than before. 
If we translate that recommendation into the numerical model and make both countries 
engage their two workers in the production of only one commodity per country, the 
following production matrix appears (both countries employing both their labourers in 
one commodity): 
4 
Great Britain 
France 
Coal 
10 
10 
Table 2: Production after specialisation, both countries concentrating their work force (2 labourers) on 
one commodity each. 
This specialisation opens the possibility for trade. Great Britain can export 5 sacks of coal 
to France and import 5 hats from there. This creates a consumption pattern, which differs 
profoundly from the production: The British have brought 10 sacks of coal to the surface, 
but they can use only 5 of them because they have exported the other half to France. On 
the other hand, having produced no hat so what ever, they can wear 5 of them 
nevertheless. The French are in a similar position: They have produced 10 hats, but 5 of 
them they sold to the British, On the other hand, although the French have mined no coal, 
they do not have to freeze; they have imported British coal. In matrix fonn, the following 
consumption pattern appears: 
Great Britain 
France 
Coal 
5 
5 
Table 3: The consumption after specialisation and trade. 
Hats 
5 
5 
Let us compare this consumption pattern with table I, where we depicted the situation 
without trade, where both countries produced both commodities. 
Great Britain 
France 
Coal 
+/- 0 
+4 
Table 4: The gains of specialisation and trade. 
5 
Hats 
+4 
+/- 0 
I 
As we can see, both countries have improved their situation dramatically. There are high 
gains (hats for Britain, coal for France), and on no field there are losses. 
It must, however, be underlined that the calculations above rest on the assumption that 
"Great Britain" and "Franc" are more or less equally productive. As regards countries 
which have reached more or less the same level of economic development, there are 
practically no economists in the world who voice objections against free trade and 
international division of labour. The matter turns, however, much more complicated (and 
much more controversial,) as soon as we regard the trade between rich and poor countries 
(see below, section 3). 
The Problems of Dependency 
The material gains of an international division of labour do not necessarily imply that it is 
always and under all circumstances advisable to follow this course. Material gains are not 
everything. 
A high degree of division of labour means also dependency. In the models above, after 
specialisation neither "Great Britain" nor "France" can exist alone any more. If e.g. 
"France" cannot deliver hats, the British can't wear any. The loss of "hats" might be 
acceptable, but what about e.g. grain? It was exactly the question of grain which started 
one of the sharpest controversies in the history of Political Economy: In 1814-15 the 
British Parliament introduced a series of new tariffs upon the importation of grain, the so-
called Corn Laws. Most economists, following the arguments laid out by Smith, were 
against these tariffs. But Thomas Robert Malthus, who first won fame with his Essay on 
the Principle of Population (1798) and who afterwards was regarded by many as Smith's 
true successor, defended the Corn Laws. In his pamphlet Grounds of an Opinion on the 
Policy of Restricting the Importation of Foreign Corn (1815) he argued, among several 
points, that foreign suppliers such as France had gained a permanent cost advantage in 
grain. So, gradually, they would drive the British farmers out of the market. This would 
be very risky for Britain because in cases of e.g. bad harvests the foreign supplier would 
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restrict their corn exports, and then Britain would end in serious problems6 So, Great 
Britain had to protect her own agricultural sector and, in this case, deviate from the line 
which Smith has argued for. Malthus' liberal colleagues were unimpressed. From then 
onwards, Malthus was no longer allowed to publish his views in the influential 
Edinburgh Review. 
In practical politics, considerations of economic security (and military security) have, of 
course, always played a role. One of the reasons why the European Economic 
Community embarked upon the course of a highly regulated and highly protective 
agrarian policy was exactly the idea that Western Europe ought to be able to be 
independent of foreign food imports. In some historical situations arguments of this kind 
became of an overriding importance. In the 1930s e.g. the Nazis followed a policy of 
systematic autarchy, as a part of war preparation, in order to be prepared in case of a 
blockade. At present, no country follows a policy of systematic autarchy, but still no state 
is prepared to give up e.g. defence technology completely. It follows, however: The more 
peaceful the general situation is, and the less important arguments of economic security 
become, the better it is for economic co-operation and division of labour. Wars, Cold 
Wars included, are destructive and cost much money, even if no shot is fired, because 
they limit the international division of labour. This argument can also be reversed: If 
states increase their division of labour, and thereby create mutual dependency, they 
increase their mutual interest in peace. This was one strong argument for the extension of 
economic ties between the Western countries and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 
Trade can also mean a bit of peace. 
Historically, the theories of Absolute Advantages (and Comparative Advantages, see the 
next section) were developed in the context of free trade and capitalist market-economies. 
In principle, however, the arguments in favour of an increased division of labour are 
independent of the economic systems. Also economies of the Soviet type could realise 
important material gains by an increased international division of labour. This was in 
principle acknowledged by the Soviet and East European governments. In 1949 they 
6 Donald Winch, Malthus, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 67. 
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formed the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON) with the explicit aim to 
develop their division of labour. In practice, however, the East European countries had 
substantially lower shares of exports and imports than Western countries on similar 
levels. This was partly due to the slow and cumbersome negotiation mechanisms within 
the COMECON. These countries were, however, also burdened by a systematic handicap 
in this respect: Their leading parties stuck to the principle that they should steer their 
economies with detailed national planning and command mechanisms. A detailed 
national planning and steering and a high degree of international division of labour are, 
however, incompatible. International division of labour means per definition less national 
steering, means less national sovereignty. The detailed national steering mechanisms 
worked systematically as a brake against an enlargement of the international division of 
labour. This was one factor, among others, which contributed to the demise of these 
systems. 
Ricardo and "This Deepest and Most Beautiful Result in all of Economics" 
As we have seen, most economists followed Smith and agreed that a country could 
realise important material gains if it concentrated on those products where it had "an 
advantage". But what happens if one country is better at both products? If one country is 
simply more productive than the other, practically through the whole range of products? 
This question has been intensely debated the last 200 years. Most economists have 
answered the question in a positive way: Even if one country is generally more 
productive, it is advantageous to engage in trade and division of labour. This answer 
relies mostly upon the theory of Comparative Advantages. 
The outline of the theory was presumably first presented in 1815, during the debates 
about the Corn Laws, by Robert Torrens, an ex-officer who turned economist, in his 
Essay on the External Corn Trade? It was, however, David Ricardo who in 1817 in his 
famous On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation , presented an elaborate 
7 Jacob Viner, Studies in the Theory a/International Trade, Clifton 1975 (fIrst published 1937), p. 441f. 
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formulation of the theory, placed it in an appropriate general setting and gave due 
emphasis to its. Therefor, it is usually Ricardo who is credited for it. 
Ricardo used some arithmetic illustrations, discussing the productivity of Great Britain 
and Portugal as to wine and textiles. We present here some different numerical models. 
The reason for this unfaithfulness towards Ricardo is, on the one hand, the wish to 
present the problems as simple as possible, and in a way parallel to the tables 1·4. 
Furthermore, in Ricardo's illustrations Portugal was the more productive country. We 
transfonn Great Britain into being the more productive country; this corresponds better to 
the economic reality of Ricardo's and our times. 
Let us suppose the following matrix of production per worker per day: 
Great Britain 
Portugal 
Textile Wine 
10 
2 
5 
4 
Table 5: The matrix of production per worker, per day. Also consumption pattern, supposed there is no 
foreign trade, and one worker is engaged in each sector. 
If we again suppose that both countries have a labour force of two workers each, this 
table also shows the pattern of consumption. At this stage we suppose there is no 
specialisation and no foreign trade, and half the work force is employed in textiles and 
wine respectively, in both countries. According to Ricardo's and Torrens' argumentation, 
also in this case specialisation and foreign trade can be advantageous. But before we 
proceed, we have to introduce wages and prices. 
Let us assume that British workers receive a wage of £ I per day, and Portuguese workers 
1 Escudo. We further assume that wages are the only factor, which determines prices. Of 
, The Works and Correspondence oj David Ricardo, edited by Piero Sraffa, with the Collaboration of M . H . 
Dobb. Volume I, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Cambridge University Press, 1951 , 
p. 134·6. 
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course, in real life the prices also contain profit, costs for raw materials, for machinery 
and depreciation, and the like. We can leave all those outside and concentrate on wages 
only. The inclusion of other cost factors will only complicate matters, without altering the 
substance of the argument. Furthermore, by focusing on wages, we have singled out the 
most important price factor. Finally, by regarding wages only, our models roughly 
correspond to Ricardo 's labour theory of value, according to which prices "in principle" 
are proportional to the labour inputs. So at this point we are faithful to him again, 
admittedly in a somewhat naiVe way (the labour theory of value, as already Ricardo 
observed, leads into very complex, not to say: daunting problems). 
If we now leave all these "buts" and "ifs" behind us, then we can calculate the prices in a 
straightforward way: A British worker gets £ 1 a day, and in one day he (she) produces 10 
units of textiles. That means the wage costs are £ 0, I per unit, and consequently, the price 
is £ 0,1. In Portugal, a worker gets I Escudo, and he (she) produces 2 units of textile. So, 
the price is 0,5 Escudos. If we calculate all the prices this way, the following matrix 
appears: 
Great 
Britain 
Portugal 
Textile Wine 
£ 0,10 £ 0,20 
0,50 Escudos 0,25 Escudos 
Table 6: The prices of the commodities, based on the assumption of wages of £ III Escudo per worker per 
day, and the productivities as depicted in table 5. 
Now we can calculate the potential effects of specialisation and foreign trade. How could 
this specialisation realistically come about? We can assume that the British see 
possibilities on the Portuguese market. British merchants sail to Lisbon and sell textiles. 
In order to penetrate the market, they have to undercut the Portuguese prices, so they sell 
cheaper than 0,5 Escudos per piece, say: 0,4 Escudos. The money they earn they can use 
to buy Portuguese wine. They offer higher prices for wine; say, they pay 0,4 Escudos per 
barrel. So, they sell textile for 0,4 Escudos and buy wine for 0,4 Escudos per unit. In fact, 
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the British exchange I piece of British textile for I barrel of Portuguese wine. This 
exchange rate between units of British textile and Portuguese wine is called the Terms of 
Trades. Here lies one of the central problems, we discuss that below. At this point, we 
simply assume a "fair rate" of I : 1. 
In the model above, the British textile exports drive Portuguese producers out of the 
market, but wine production becomes stimulated. In the end, both Portuguese workers 
engage in viticulture, the production rises from 4 to 8 barrels. This, however, does not 
imply that Great Britain also concentrates all her production in one sector. As we shall 
see, the different productivities and the restrictions of mutual demand have the effect that 
Great Britain can continue with wine-production. British wine production falls from 5 to 
4 units, and she moves only "0,2 workers" from viticulture to textile manufacture. We 
receive the following production matrix, after specialisation: 
Textile Wine 
Great Britain 12 4 
Portugal 8 
Table 7: Production after specialisation, I. example. Portugal engages 2 workers in v iticul ture, Great 
Britain 1,2 workers in textile manufacture and 0,8 in wine-production. 
With prices as assumed above, we receive the following trade pattern: Great Britain sells 
2 units of textile to Portugal and earns 0,8 Escudos (2 x 0,4 Escudos). Great Britain buys 
for that amount 2 wine barrels (2 x 04, Escudos). We notice en passanl, the balance of 
payments is in equilibrium for both countries. In fact, the model is constructed in a way 
that this condition is fulfilled, in order not let balance of payment problems confuse the 
argumentation. 
If production and trade are modelled this way, we receive a new consumption pattern. 
Great Britain has produced 12 textile units and exported 2 of them; this leaves 10 units 
for British consumption. As regards wine, Britain has produced 4 barrels and imported 2. 
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So, the British can consume 6 barrels. If the Portuguese consumption is computed in the 
analogous way, as production minus export plus import, the following matrix appears. 
Great Britain 
Portugal 
Textile 
10 
2 
Table 8: Consumption after specialisation and "fair trade". 
6 
6 
If we compare this consumption pattern with the situation prior to specialisation and 
trade, we see the following gains: 
Textiles Wines 
Great Britain +/-0 + I 
Portugal +/-0 + 2 
Table 9: The gains from free trade, "fair trade" supposed. 
There are only gains and no losses, and both countries profit from it. In this case the 
benefits for Portugal are even greater than the British ones. So, also when two countries 
at different levels of productivity begin to trade, the results are positive, in this case it 
makes sense to concentrate the resources on the production where the country has got a 
Comparative A dvantage. As to wine production, Portugal is inferior to Britain in absolute 
terms, but she has a comparative advantage on this, compared to textile production in 
Portugal. This way, Torrens and Ricardo obtained "this deepest and most beautiful result 
in all of economics,,9 
However, if we have a closer look at the tables above, two problems appear for the 
weaker country, i. e. Portugal: Portugal had to concentrate all her work force in 
viticulture, in the model she moved a "whole" worker from textile to wine production_ 
'Ronald Findlay, 'Comparative Advantage', John EatweJl, Murray Milgate, Peter Newman (eds.), The New 
Palgrrxve. A Dictionary of Economics, vol. I, London and Basingstoke, 1987, p. 514-517, esp. p. 514. 
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But Great Britain moved only "0,2" workers. That means that Portugal had to carry a 
much higher burden of adaptation, for Great Britain it was comparatively easy. Seen from 
a Portuguese point of view: Were two barrels of wine worth this profound 
transformation? In fact, Portugal received economic gains only if the gains from trade 
were bigger than the adaptation costs. It is perhaps one of the greatest omissions in many 
books written in the economic main stream that the costs of adaptation are often 
completely neglected. 
As a rule of thumb, adaptation is much easier for the higher developed countries. At best, 
adaptation happens inside well-run firms: The management follows the development on 
the market closely and alters the production correspondingly. No problem. But in the 
worst case, people loose the basis for their existence. This is typically the case for more 
primitive forms of agriculture, if the crop people depended on, fell in price. Another 
example is the closing down of a mine when the prices of ore or coal cannot support the 
production any more. Both cases are frequent in countries of the Third World. So, poorer 
countries have usually to adapt more, and their adaptation is usually much more costly for 
them than for the rich world. The well-run companies, which adapt smoothly, are mostly 
located in the rich world. That's why this part of the world is rich. 
The simple model above also shows that the positive results crucially depend upon the 
condition that complete adaptation, however costly, is possible. Let us suppose that 
something impedes that the Portuguese labour force concentrates completely on wine 
production. It is, for instance, conceivable that there is no more soil for vineyards. We 
can also assume that producing wine requires much experience and skill that the textile 
workers do not have. In this case, the main effect of the British trade offensive is the ruin 
of the Portuguese textile industry, with mass poverty and destruction as a consequence, 
and least for quite some time. Many historical experiences seem to have followed this 
pattern. In e.g. the Germany of the 1840s, the hand loom weavers were slowly driven into 
ruin by cheap British cotton imports. That Germany "in principle" had a comparative 
advantage as to e.g. coal and steel, can explain Germany's successful industrialisation 
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later, but that did not help the hand-loom weavers. China and India have experienced 
many dreadful experiences of this kind, and currently Russia does so. 
Furthermore, back to the model, "Portugal" is now completely dependent upon the export 
of one product, she is now a "wine monoculture", whereas Great Britain contains both a 
strong textile industry and a substantial wine production. If something happens that 
disturbs foreign trade, let it be strikes in the British industry, or war, or whatever, then 
Portugal is in severe trouble. By comparison, if e .g. an invasion of malign insects 
destroys the Portuguese wine production, and thereby the deliveries to Britain, then the 
British problems are much less severe because there are still many British producers left. 
Many Third-World countries ended in conditions similar to "Portugal" in the model: 
Ghana became heavily dependent on Cacao, the Ivory Coast on coffee, Zambia on copper 
exports, and Cuba on sugar cane. Those countries have regularly come into severe 
problems when the prices of their one commodity fell. And the prices of commodities 
such as coffee or copper have usually shown a much higher volatility than the prices of 
manufactured products I O. 
This shows us that the characteristics of the products in question are not irrelevant. Some 
products can be sold on growing markets, with huge future possibilities. Those are 
usually highly sophisticated manufactured products, currently for instance devices in the 
fields of information technology or biotechnology. But other products have their future 
behind them; their markets are almost stagnant or even declining. This is the case with 
many agricultural products or metals. But the logic of Comparative Advantages can drive 
(and actually have driven) many underdeveloped countries into a production pattern 
where they have specialised on the "wrong" products, here understood as products to be 
sold on stagnant markets. 
10 The Economist (2,d January 1999, p. 92) infonns: "The metal index has faUen by 45% from its peak in 
January 1995. A sustained recovery in metal prices is unlikely without cuts in output. Copper is al a 12-year 
low, and nickel al an II-year low." According 10 a chart, in the one year between December 30th 1997 and 
December 29'h 1998, Sugar prices feU by about 37 per cent, Nickel by 35, coffee by 20 and copper by aboul 
18 per cent (ibid.). 
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So, even on the assumption on "fare trade", the "Portuguese" have reasons to consider the 
matter carefully before they follow the logic of Comparative Advantages. In the light of 
these considerations, if taken the amount of necessary adaptation, the problems of 
dependency and the danger of "wrong" specialisation into consideration, it is easy 
understandable that historically the enthusiasm for free trade has been most widespread in 
the highly-developed countries, such as Great Britain in the 19th century, by then the 
economically leading country in the world. 
There is, however, also a shadow upon the beauty of fair trade in the rich countries: If we 
assume stable Terms of Trade" of I unit of textile to I barrel of Portuguese wine, we 
must conclude that the division between the British and the Portuguese market will 
disappear. Trade will result in one big "world market" with uniform prices. If we follow 
the models above: We assumed that the British merchants sold textiles for 0,4 Escudos 
per unit, and bought 4 barrels of wine for 0,4 Escudos per unit. Not let us suppose an 
exchange rate of £ I : 2,5 Escudos (we discuss the problem of exchange rates below) . If 
we abstract from transport costs, the British prices must also change. The prices of 
textiles in Britain will rise from £ 0, I to £ 0,16, but wine will fall from 0,2 pounds to 0, 16 
pounds. So, in the end, the prices are equalised in Britain too. Otherwise, if e.g. wine in 
Britain is still more expensive than a unit oftextile, if a barrel costs, let's say £ 0,18, then 
Portuguese wine will still be cheaper on the British market. Portuguese wine, to repeat, 
costs 0,4 Escudos, that is £ 0,16, so British wine still cannot compete against Portuguese 
wine, unless the British producers lower their prices to £ 0,16. So, "fair trade" will result 
in the following price matrix: 
Great Britain 
Portugal 
Textiles 
£ 0,16 
0, 4 Escudos 
Table 10: The unifonn prices under the condition of "fair trade". 
Wine 
£ 0,16 
0,4 Escudos 
Here our models exhibit a small inconsistency: Above we supposed that the Portuguese 
could at most export 4 wine barrels to England, they produce at full capacity. This would 
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always leave a kind of niche for British producers, so they could keep prices up. If we, 
however, enlarge our simple two-country model with more countries and add more 
"PortugaIs", then this inconsistency disappears, then there is no safe niche for British 
wine producers, they have to lower their price level to the world market level (i.e. £ 
0,16). 
This way, the market mechanism will create one price system for both countries. This, 
however, produces severe effects on the income distribution. Above we presumed that 
wages were the only cost factor. Conversely, the income generated by the sales was used 
to pay wages, and wages only. Again, the following argument will not alter substantially 
if we add other kinds of income, such as profits for capitalists. This means in turn that the 
wages in English viticulture have to be lowered considerable. If a barrel of English wine 
can be sold for £ 0,16, and if - as supposed above - one worker can produce 5 barrels per 
day, then his salary can only be £ 0,8 (=5 x £ 0,16). Before the introduction of free trade, 
the wage was £ I a day; so, the wine producer has to accept a wage reduction of a fifth. 
On the other hand, the textile workers can be happy. Their wages augmented by a third, 
from £ 1 to £ 1,6. So, the international trade has produced a remarkable income spread: 
Before, everyone got £ 1, now one group gets double as much as the other. Certainly, we 
cannot expect the British wine producers to be enthusiastic about free trade. At this point 
a convinced free-trader wiII argue that this wage spread is positive. It makes people move 
from the wine yards to the textile manufactures. And if the remaining wine producers are 
unsatisfied with their income, they should change profession too. This argument is 
basically correct. It must, however, be emphasised that labour mobility in general is low. 
People seldom move because of wage differentials, so inequalities as the ones mentioned 
above will remain for a very long time. Usually, only if people get unemployed, only if 
their jobs are properly destroyed, do people move. In the model above, the free trade 
result was that "0,2" workers in the British viticulture became unemployed and had to 
move to "Manchester", where the textile manufactures are located. A liberal economist 
can argue that this was only beneficial for the person in question, hislher salary rose from 
£ I a day before to £ 1,6. But given the point that becoming unemployed and moving to 
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"Manchester" implies heavy economic and non-economic costs (such as loosing your 
friends and acquaintances), their enthusiasm is presumably low too. 
So, the wine producers have good reasons to resist free trade. The simplest way to 
prevent the entry of cheap Portuguese wine is, of course, the introduction of a high tariff. 
And not surprisingly, historically European "wine" producers have a long history of 
successfully demanding tariffs of this kind. They thereby not only prevent their own 
incomes from falling, they also prevent the incomes of "Portuguese" wine producers and 
of "English" textile producers from rising. Tariff policy is a kind of class struggle. In 
England in 1815 the "wine" producers won, in 1846 the textile producers were victorious 
(when the Corn Laws become abolished). Today, the European Union still maintains one 
of the highest tariffs against agricultural imports in the world. 
The argument, which has been used most to placate angry "English" wine producers, has 
been the following: In the models above, "Britain" experienced a general rise in income. 
Before, 2 workers earned £ I each, which gives an aggregated income of £ 2. Now, after 
free trade, the general income has risen from £ 2 to £ 2,56 (1,2 worker x £ 1,6 + 0,8 
workers x £ 0,8). "On average", the British have turned richer. Many liberal economists 
have pointed out that the gains were so great that the losers could be compensated. The 
first one to argue on this line was presumably John Stuart Mill , in an article about "The 
Com Laws" in the Westminster Review, in April 1825: For "every pound which finds it 
way into the pockets of the landlords, in consequence of the Com Laws, the community 
is robbed of several. It would be better to have a repeal of the Corn Laws, even clogged 
by compensation, than not to have it at all: . .. no one could complain of a change, by 
which, though an enormous amount of evil would be prevented, no one would lose." II 
The possibility of compensation exists. In the numerical example above, one might 
conceive a tax system which transfers money from the textile workers to the remaining 
wine producers. If the aggregate British income becomes divided equally, the result will 
be a uniform income of £ 1,28. To bring this result about, the textile workers must accept 
11 As quoted by Unwin, op. cit. , p. 183 . 
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that £ 0,32 of their income will be taxed away (20 per cent), to be transferred to the wine 
producers. Even after taxation, the incomes in the textile industry are considerably higher 
than before we enter free trade (1,26 instead of £ I), so from this point of view, the 
operation is feasible. It is, however, an open question whether transfers of this magnitude 
are politically feasible. Even in welfare states with a heavy tax burden economic losers, 
e.g. unemployed, get a compensation only for a part of their losses. So, the often-quoted 
compensation-argument sounds a bit hollow. We can conclude, even in the case of 
compensations, that there will be net losers from free trade, even in rich countries such as 
"Britain", at least in the short run. 
The compensation argument contains one important truth: Only if a welfare state 
distributes gains and losses to some extent, can the advocates of free trade expect to gain 
and maintain broad popular support. Otherwise, there will be large sections of the 
popUlation who with good reasons resist open borders. It is no coincidence: Today in e.g. 
the Scandinavian countries or the Netherlands, practically no one advocates a 
protectionist policy. But in the US, which as to social policy must be regarded as an 
underdeveloped country, protectionism is quite substantial, see for instance Pat 
Buchanan's campaign for presidency l2. 
The problem of losers and of growing inequalities is, of course even more acute in the 
weaker countries. In our models above this problem was "solved" for "Portugal" by the 
simple fact that we mercilessly drove all the population engaged in textile production to 
the wine regions. We simply assumed complete adaptation. Indeed, if we transform a 
society so massively, this problem, new inequality generated by trade, does not exist. As 
argued above, to assume such a smooth and complete adaptation is hardly a realistic 
assumption, and the results of "incomplete adaptation" can be, and have been, outright 
horrible. 
12 Patrick Buchanan has recently published a book (The Great Betrayal, Little Brown). The Economist 
assures us : "The content ofMr. Buchanan's prose is largely nonsense." (The Economist, September 12th -
181h 1998, The Economist Review, p. 10). The paper is presumably perfectly right. The interesting problem 
is, however, why politicians who utter nonsense can gain influence. The Economist is a high-quality paper, 
but it often polemises against welfare state arrangements, which, usually, no matter how comprehensive 
they are, are deemed as being "excessive". But by attacking welfare state arrangements the paper actually 
attacks one of the conditions for free trade, a principle the paper otherwise whole-heartedly supports. 
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On the other hand, if adaptation works, under the condition of "fair trade" the incomes in 
the poor countries rise considerably. In the models above: With a productivity of four 
barrels a day, a wine price of 0,4 Escudos means an income of 1,6 Escudos a day: 60 per 
cent more than before, an increase poor people really can feel. 
The Terms of Trade and the Effects of Economic Aggressiveness 
The matter turns much worse, from a "Portuguese" point of view, if we suppose different 
terms of trade. Above we assumed that the British merchants sold their textiles on the 
Portuguese market for 0,4 Escudos, and bought wine for 0,4 Escudos per barrel. This is 
the same as to say: The British gave I textile unit and received I barrel of wine. Now we 
alter this assumption: The trade is strictly carried out on the basis of the Portuguese 
prices, as they were before the British carne (see table 6): 0,5 Escudos per textile unit and 
0,25 Escudos per wine barrel. 
Trading on the basis of Portuguese prices sounds fair for Portugal, but it is actually not. 
We still assume that Great Britain has increased her textile production from 10 to 12 
units. Also in this case the British can export 2 textile units to Portugal. But now they 
earn I Escudo (2 x 0,5 Escudos). With this I Escudo they can buy 4 barrels of wine (4 x 
0,25 Escudos). 
If we now look at the consumption possibilities, as the result of own production minus 
export plus import, a new pattern emerges which diverges considerably from the one in 
table 8: 
Great Britain 
Portugal 
Textile Wine 
10 
2 
8 
4 
Table II: Consumption after specialisation and trading with Portuguese prices. 
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If we compare this consumption with the situation before specialisation (table 5), the 
following matrix of the gains from foreign trade appears: 
Great Britain 
Portugal 
Textile Wine 
+/- 0 + 4 
+/- 0 +/-0 
Table 12: The gains from foreign trade, trading with Portuguese prices. 
As we can see, in this case all the benefits ended on the British side. For Portugal the 
result was plus/minus zero as to both products. In fact, we have to conclude that the 
whole operation was detrimental for Portugal: Again she had to undergo a profound and 
costly process of adaptation, but had no gains from it. Taken the adaptation costs into 
consideration, she incurred heavy net losses. Perhaps the experiences of countries such as 
China, whose harbours in 1842 were opened by the British by the use of military force 
(not a liberal way of introducing liberalism), fit to this model. 
Furthermore, in the model above, "Portugal" is again completely dependent upon one 
export product, and she might have undergone a process of "wrong" specialisation. We 
must conclude that the logic of Ricardo's assumptions shows that free trade is not 
beneficial under all circumstances. 
This "worst-case-scenario" for Portugal was the outcome ofthe assumption that the trade 
was done on the basis of the old Portuguese prices, 0,5 Escudos per textile unit and 0,25 
Escudos per wine barrel. This is logically equivalent to saying that I unit of textile is 
worth 2 wine barrels. So, the British could exchange I unit of British textiles for 2 barrels 
of Portuguese wine. But in the "fair trade" example above, 1 British textile unit was 
exchanged for I wine barrel: The Terms of Trade have deteriorated enormously for the 
Portuguese side. 
"Unfair Trade" will exacerbate the problem of income distribution within "Great 
Britain". This becomes apparent when we consider exchange rates and the effects on the 
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British price system, after the cheap Portuguese wine will be dumped upon the British 
market. We suppose the British textile manufactures to be the aggressive part. They 
successfully penetrate the Portuguese market and sell their textile to the former 
Portuguese price of 0,5 Escudos. In Great Britain a piece of textile costs £ 0, I. This 
implies an exchange rate of £ I: 5 Escudos. As in table 6, the British buy the Portuguese 
wine at a price of 0,25 Escudos, or £ 0,05. The Portuguese wine barrels are thereafter sold 
on the British market. If the British wine producers want to stay in the market, they have 
to lower their prices from £ 0,2 to this level of 0,05 (plus transportation costs, of course). 
In other words, they have to reduce their prices (and their wages) down to a quarter of the 
previous level. In this perspective, the Portuguese and the British wine producers have a 
common interest in combating unfair trade. 
Ricardo's model opens, however, also for an outcome where Portugal receives all the 
gains. This will be the result, if the British prices are used, or, which is the same, if 2 
units of British textiles will be exchanged for I barrel of wine. This presupposes a pattern 
of production as sketched below. 
Great Britain 
Portugal 
Textiles Wine 
18 
8 
Table 13 : Specialised production after a successful Portuguese penetration of the British wine market. 
The Portuguese have specialised completely on wine, and they have driven the British 
producers out of the market, as far as they could. Their capacity is, however, not big 
enough to supply the British market completely, there are a few British vineyards left. 
The Portuguese sell 4 wine barrels in Great Britain and earn £ 0,8 (£ 0,2 x 4). With these 
£ 0,8 they buy 8 textile units (£ 0,1 x 8). This produces a consumption patter as follows: 
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Great Britain 
Portugal 
Textiles Wine 
10 
8 
5 
4 
Table 14: Consumption after specialisation and trade with British prices. 
This time all the material gains from trade ended on the Portuguese side: 
Great Britain 
Portugal 
Textiles 
+/- 0 
+6 
Wine 
+/- 0 
+/- 0 
Table 15: The material gains from specialisation, after trading with British prices. 
This outcome is, of course, much more favourable for the Portuguese than the one before. 
But even in this case, it is the Portuguese who have to adapt most, and still it is the 
Portuguese who become completely dependent on one export article. But the British have 
to adapt more than in the case before and shift 0,8 workers, not only 0,2, to textile 
production. And their viticulture is now almost extinct, with only 0,2 workers left there 
(compared to 0,8 workers previously). 
As the examples of "fair trade" and of the cases using Portuguese or British prices show, 
the Terms of Trade are of crucial importance as to the question, how the gains from trade 
will be distributed. Which factors determine them? It is, as a matter of fact, a question, 
which has occupied generations of economists. It is in this respect interesting to notice 
that many standard textbooks, written in a liberal bend, simply jump over this problem. 
For instance, David Begg, Stanley Fischer and Rudiger Dornbusch confine themselves to 
the proposition that the "world economy" gains; obviously, they regard the problem how 
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the gains are distributed, as being of minor relevance. 13 An exception is e.g. the well-
written and stimulating textbook by Ernest Kay Hunt and Howard 1. Sherman l4 
Within the logic of Ricardian models, the Terms of Trade must lie within an interval 
whose borders are marked by the relative productivities, and thus the price ratios inside 
the countries in question. In the models above, if we trade with British prices, the 
exchange rate is I textile: 0,5 wine; trading with Portuguese prices implies a ratio of I 
textile: 2 wine. So, the Terms of Trade must be: 
I British textile unit [0,5 - 2] barrels of Portuguese wine . 
But where does it faU inside this interval? The standard answer within main stream 
economy is: International prices, and thus the Terms of Trade, are determined by 
"international supply and demand". This is certainly true, but it does not explain too 
much, unless it is specified what determines supply, and in particular demand. 
Furthermore, the argumentation with international supply and demand might induce 
readers to perceive these factors as being beyond the control of the actors in question, 
consequently, the Terms of Trade might be perceived as something determined by the 
outside, something which has to be accepted. The logic of Ricardo 's model points, 
however, in a different direction. This becomes apparent if we formulate the problem of 
the Terms of Trade as the - logically equivalent - problem: Do they trade with "British" 
or with "Portuguese" prices. This the actors can influence. 
How can we realistically model situations where the trade is done on the basis of 
"Portuguese" prices (which, to remember, favour the British)? The assumptions for such 
a situation are not too far-fetched: Let us depict a situation where British merchants sail 
to Lisbon and offer British textiles. The price for textiles in Portugal were (see table 6) 
0,5 Escudos per unit. In order to enter the market, the British offer textiles for 0,4 
Escudos. At the same time they pay wine prices higher than usual. This stimulates the 
i3 David Begg, Stanley Fischer, Rudiger Dornbusch, Economics. Fourth edition, Maidenhead, Birkshire, 
1994, p. 582. 
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wine production, and this is exactly the mechanism that brings the Portuguese adaptation 
about. If this process has been going on sufficiently long enough, then all Portuguese 
textile manufactures are driven out of the market. At this point in time the British can 
raise the prices for their textiles, there are no Portuguese competitors any more. It would, 
however, not be advisable to raise them too much, i.e. above the previous Portuguese 
price level because this could encourage Portuguese production again. So, a successful 
British trade offensive on the Portuguese market will result in a foreign trade where the 
previous Portugal price pattern is reproduced (and the entire benefit ends on the British 
side). 
But as we saw above, an outcome of this kind is not the only possibility. Now let us 
suppose that the Portuguese were the faster and more aggressive ones: Foreign trade 
begins by Portuguese merchants sailing to London and offering cheap Portuguese wine, 
say, for £ 0,15 per barrel, thereby undercutting British prices by 50 per cent. After having 
driven a sufficient number of British producers out of the wine market (and into textile 
production), the Portuguese can raise their prices to the previous British level of £ 0,2 
level. So, trade will be done on the basis of British prices . 
In this perspective, it is the more aggressive one, the one who actively penetrates the 
market of the other, who reaps the benefits ofintemational trade. In principle, this can be 
the Portuguese as well as the British. And certainly, one conclusion holds: If you cannot 
avoid foreign trade, then you are well advised to be active and aggressive. Just standing at 
the beach and watch the British ships coming, is tantamount to disaster. 
In this context it is perhaps illustrating to think of the historical experiences of China and 
Japan. China at first tried to prevent foreign economic penetration, and then after 1842 
basically endured it. But the Japanese after 1855, when US war ships under Commodore 
Matthew Perry forced the Japanese to open their harbours, quickly embarked upon an 
active economic strategy. The remarkably different results in the economic development 
" Hunt, Ernest Kay and Sherman, Howard J., Economics. An Introduction to Traditional and Radical 
Views, Sixth Edition, New York, 1990, p. 616-618. 
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of these two countries can perhaps to quite some extent ascribed to the these different 
patterns of reaction. 
As we said above, in principle the "Portuguese" can be as aggressive as the "British". 
But, alas, it seems as if the British have the better cards on hand as regards 
aggressiveness: A successful penetration of foreign markets requires competence in 
trading, information, and economic reserves, factors which are more likely to privilege 
the economically stronger side. In principle, the ships can be hired, but it is much easier if 
you own already the ships. In 1842 the British had suitable ships, the Chinese had not. 
Many, presumably most economists will argue that the case of "Portuguese" prices is an 
exception. In most realistic cases the common price level will lie somewhere in the 
middle between the Portuguese and British prices. It is, however, a question how 
exceptional this exception has been in history. If the present writer is right in his 
presumption that 19th-century China (and perhaps also 19th-century India) have 
undergone this experience, then this "exception" affected indeed large groups of human 
beings for quite some time. 
Exchange Rates and Wages 
It follows from the assumptions above that the exchange rates must lie within a certain 
interval, if there is to be foreign trade at all. If foreign trade is to be started, two 
propositions must hold: 
1) British textiles must be cheaper than Portuguese ones; otherwise the British cannot 
export their products to Portugal. So, in numerical form, the following unequation must 
be respected: 
£ 0,1 < 0,5 Escudos, or £ I < 5 Escudos 
2) Portuguese wine must be cheaper than British one; otherwise the Portuguese cannot 
export wine to Great Britain. In numerical terms: 
£ 0,2 > 0,25 Escudos, or £ I > 1,25 Escudos. 
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If we put these unequations together, it follows that the exchange rate for £ I must lie 
within the interval of [1,25; 5] Escudos. If the pound is too strong, say to rate of 6 
Escudos, then the British textiles cannot compete with the Portuguese ones. If, on the 
other hand, the Escudo rises to a rate of I pound, the Portuguese wine turns too 
expensive; it cannot be exported to Britain. This is, however, only valid on the basic 
starting assumptions. If we e.g. introduce inflation processes and, say, double the 
Portuguese wages, then the whole interval of possible exchange rates changes doubles, 
and so does the "fair trade rate" . The changing of monetary aggregates has no direct 
influence on the dynamics of Comparative Advantages. This "neutrality" of monetary 
aggregates is a general feature of classical economics. 
Under the above-mentioned conditions, the exchange rate reflects the Terms of Trade, or 
whether the trade is fair or not. We calculated above that the "fair trade", where I unit of 
British textiles gets exchanged for I barrel of Portuguese wine, implies an exchange rate 
of £ I : 2,5 Escudos. The very unfair trade at Portuguese relative prices (I textile unit = 2 
wine barrels) implies an exchange rate of I : 5. 
We saw above that the "fair trade" implied an exchange rate of £ I : 2,5 Escudos. 
Furthermore, the British wages were 1,6 and £ 0,8. Under the conditions of "fair trade" 
the Portuguese wine producers have experienced a substantial increase of income. They 
sell the wine for 0,4 Escudos. Given a productivity of 4 barrels a day, this means 1,6 
Escudos per day, as compared to I Escudo previously. Calculated in pounds, they earn £ 
0,64. a day. As we saw above, under the condition of fair trade, a British wine producer 
earns £ 0,8, a British textile worker £ 1,6. The incomes thereby reflect exactly the 
productivities: British wine producers produce 5 barrels a day, in contrast to 4 in 
Portugal. And calculated in money terms, a British textile worker is double as productive 
as a British wine producer. 
If wages are in proportion to productivity, that only sounds fair. One has, however, to be 
aware of the fact that "productivity" is also a function of "fair" or "unfair" trade . Let us 
again examine the case where the British penetrate the Portuguese market, so that trade is 
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done on the basis of Portuguese prices, which implies an exchange rate of 1:5 . As we saw 
above, under the condition of "unfair" trade, the British wine prices fall to £ 0,05. This 
leaves an income of only £ 0,25. The Portuguese wine producers earn I Escudo, or £ 0,2, 
so their wage is again at a level of 80 per cent of the British wine producers' . As is the 
productivity. The wage relation between British and Portuguese wine producers is not 
altered. They produce the same product, and changes of prices do not alter the relation of 
productivities within the same field of production. But if we compare the relation 
between textile and wine producers in Britain, the wine producers earn only a quarter of 
what can be earned in the textile industry. This also reflects "productivity": A British 
textile worker produces textiles worth £ I a day, so his productivity is £ 1 a day, whereas 
in British viticulture, productivity is only £ 0,25 a day (5 barrels a £ 0,05), or one quarter 
of the productivity in textile. But under conditions of "fair" trade, productivity and 
income differed only as 2: I. So, "unfair" trade, by changing the prices, also changed the 
price relation between textile and wine, and thereby the relation of productivity between 
those sectors. Production and productivity must be measured in relative prices, and if we 
change them, we change the relation of productivity. Under "fair" trade, a British textile 
worker earned 2,5 times as much as a Portuguese wine producers (£ 1,6 to 1,6 Escudos, 
at an exchange rate of I : 2,5). Under "unfair" trade, the wage in the English textile 
industry is five times higher than in Portuguese viticulture. 
Summary 
All in all , the model of Comparative Advantages is a powerful set of arguments for free 
trade. There are, however, many spots on the beauty: There are situations conceivable 
where the Terms of Trades are so unfavourable for the weaker side that all the benefits 
end on the rich side. Taken the costs of adaptation into consideration, this means disaster 
for "Portugal". Furthermore, trade, which is beneficial for both sides, presupposes a 
smooth and complete adaptation. Every kind of problem that impedes adaptation, or 
slows it down significantly, can have disastrous consequences. 
The Terms of Trade must lie within an interval whose borders are given by the relative 
prices inside the countries in question. And although it is difficult to detennine the 
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reasons for the location of the Terms of Trades within the possible interval, it seems as if 
economic aggressiveness, the will and ability to penetrate a foreign market plays a key 
role. The aggressive one shapes the Terms of Trade in his favour. 
Fair trade is beneficial for the rich country, but it creates an uneven distribution of 
income. The inequality inside the rich country increases, the more unfair the trade is. 
Potential losers in the rich countries, and the people of the poor countries, have a 
common interest in making the trade as fair as possible. In theory, the losers in the rich 
countries can be compensated. But the transfers necessary for a complete compensation 
are so huge that it is not likely that they are realistic from a political point of view. But at 
least partial compensation seems to be a necessary condition for free trade. So, free trade 
presupposes a welfare state. Economic liberalism and the welfare state are 
complementary. 
If there is no welfare state (or an insufficient one), free trade unavoidably mobilises the 
"wine" producers in "Great Britain" for the demand of tariffs. Tariffs are a kind of class 
struggle of the British wine producers against the Portuguese wine producers and the 
British textile manufacturers. 
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